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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j). 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(l) (Repealed May 15, 2003): 
The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an arbitration 
agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised concerning the 
existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the matters covered by the agreement, 
the court shall determine those issues and order or deny arbitration accordingly. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-108(l) (Effective May 15, 2003): 
(1) On motion of a person showing an agreement to arbitrate and alleging another 
person's refusal to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement: (a) if the refusing party does not 
appear or does not oppose the motion, the court shall order the parties to arbitrate; and (b) 
if the refusing party opposes the motion, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the 
issue and order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there is no enforceable agreement 
to arbitrate. 
3. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9(b): 
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake 
shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind 
of a person may be averred generally. 
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RESPONSE TO MR, WHATLEY'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires Mr. Whatley to 
include in his opening brief "A statement of facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review . . . supported by citations to the record. . . . " Instead of setting forth any facts 
in his brief supported by citations to the record, Mr. Whatley refers the Court to his 
anemic statement of the case and his amended complaint. The propriety of such a 
reference in light of the requirements of Rule 24(a)(7) is questionable at best. More 
importantly, however, Mr. Whatley has omitted two important facts between his statement 
of the case and his two-sentence statement of the facts. Those facts are: 
1. After operating World-Wide Photo for a year Mr. Whatley abandoned the 
business in April 2002 and refused to continue making payments to the Chapmans as 
required by the Agreement. (Appellant's Addendum at 5,118; see also Record, at 125.) 
2. After receiving very short notice from Mr. Whatley that he was abandoning 
the business, Mr. Chapman took over operating World-Wide Photo as trustee/gratuitous 
bailee on behalf of Mr. Whatley and at Mr. Whatley's request. Mr. Chapman has been 
operating the business in that capacity ever since. (Appellant's Addendum at 5, % IS; see 
also Record, at 140.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The trial court's November 12, 2003 modification of the April 2003 
order is harmless error and helps Mr. Whately in any case. 
Mr. Whately's complaint about the trial court's November 12, 2003 modification 
of its April 2003 order is purely procedural. The November 12 modification is harmless 
error and actually helps Mr. Whatley as it obviates the necessity for him to file any further 
lawsuits seeking judicial review of the arbitration award, should he be dissatisfied with that 
award. 
II. The trial court correctly ordered Mr. Whatley to submit his claims to 
arbitration. 
The Utah Arbitration Act and Utah case law favor arbitration. Section 78-31a-4(l) 
of the Utah Code Annotated states, in relevant part, "The court, upon motion of any party 
showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate." In 
addition, the Utah Supreme Court said, in Central Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest 
Associates, 2002 UT 3, \ 16, 40 P.3d, "We interpret the agreement [between the parties] 
keeping in mind our policy of encouraging arbitration." The agreement between Mr. 
Whatley and the Chapmans requires that they submit to arbitration, "In the event of a 
dispute under [the] agreement." (Appellant's Addendum at 33, 1f 9(m); see also Record, 
at 46.) Mr. Whatley's argument that none of his causes of action "arise under" the 
Agreement flies in the face of logic. 
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Regardless of the labels applied to Mr. Whatley's causes of action, each of the 
causes of action boil down to general allegations that the Chapmans breached the 
Agreement. Mr. Whatley has also failed to plead fraud with particularity against Mr. 
Christensen and the Chapmans. Hence, Mr. Whatley's fraud allegations do not absolve 
him of his obligation to arbitrate and the lower court was correct to compel Mr. Whatley 
to submit all of his claims to arbitration. 
III. The lower court properly treated the Chapmans' motion to dismiss as a 
motion to dismiss and not a motion for summary judgment. 
Next, the lower court properly treated the Chapmans' motion to dismiss as a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and not a motion for summary judgment. Judge Laycock 
ignored the affidavit of Bruce Chapman, accepted the allegations contained in the 
complaint as true and resolved all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Whatley. Those 
facts and inferences are: 1) that Mr. Whately and the Chapmans entered into an agreement 
with respect to the sale of World-Wide Photo; 2) that the Chapmans have not done all that 
the Agreement requires of them; and 3) paragraph 9(m) of the Agreement requires the 
parties to submit "any action" to arbitration in the event of a dispute. There is no way to 
construe the contractual obligation to arbitrate in favor of Mr. Whately and not order the 
parties to attend arbitration. 
IV. The lower court properly denied Mr. Whatley's Rule 56(f) motion. 
Finally, the lower court properly denied Mr. Whatley's Rule 56(f) motion. Mr. 
Whatley has the right to do discovery in the arbitration proceeding. Hence, he is not 
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prejudiced by the denial of his motion. In addition, Rule 56(f) is not a fishing licence that 
authorizes Mr. Whatley to glibly throw out words like fraud and then grope around trying 
to find facts to support his allegations. The purpose of discovery is to obtain evidence that 
supports clearly-stated allegations, not to try to create facts out of thin air as to support 
previously alleged causes of action. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S NOVEMBER 12, 2003 ORDER IS HARMLESS 
ERROR AND HELPS MR. WHATLEY IN ANY CASE. 
Mr. Whatley's first argument is that the trial court improperly modified its April 
29, 2003 order by issuing a new decision on November 12, 2003, during the pendency of 
this appeal. The general rule in Utah is that "the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over 
a case while it is under advisement on appeal." Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc. 
v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305, 306 (Utah 1996). It thus appears that the trial court 
erred in issuing its November 12 ruling. However, Mr. Whatley makes no attempt to 
explain to this Court what the November 12 ruling is, how that ruling came about, or why 
it is troublesome. Mr. Whatley simply says, "[Sjince the lower court lost jurisdiction 
approximately five months ago, that court's latest documents are void." (Appellant's 
brief, at 5.) What Mr. Whatley fails to explain is that the November 12 ruling came as 
a direct result of Mr. Whatley's own actions. This Court deserves an explanation. 
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On April 29, 2003, Judge Lay cock of the Fourth District Court issued an order 
dismissing Mr. Whatley 's claims against the Chapmans and Mr. Christensen. Specifically, 
paragraphs 17 and 18 of Judge Laycock's order say: 
117 Defendants' motion to compel arbitration is granted, and, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(l), the Court orders the Plaintiff and Defendants 
to submit all of their claims with respect to the Agreement, including all of 
Plaintiff's causes of action raised in the complaint, to arbitration. 
f 18 The Court has discretion under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-4 to dismiss 
or stay this lawsuit pending the outcome of arbitration. Given the Court's 
findings, the lawsuit is hereby dismissed as all of Plaintiff's claims arise 
under the contract between Plaintiff and the Chapmans, and are subject to a 
valid, binding arbitration clause. (Emphasis added.) 
(Addendum, Exhibit A.) Hence, rather than stay the lawsuit, Judge Laycock dismissed 
the parties and sent them and all of their claims to arbitration pursuant to their written 
agreement. 
Notwithstanding Judge Laycock's order that Mr. Whatley submit all of the claims 
raised in his complaint to arbitration, Mr. Whately re-filed the exact same claims with the 
fourth district court on July 31, 2003 in the form of a cross claim against the Chapmans 
in a separate lawsuit called MM Property Management L. C. v. World-Wide Photo, Inc. 
et.al., Civil No. 030400447. As it happened, the MM Property case was also assigned to 
Judge Laycock, who had ordered Mr. Whatley into arbitration in April 2003. In response 
to Mr. Whatley's cross claim, the Chapmans essentially re-filed the motion to dismiss and 
motion to compel arbitration that they filed in the original Whatley v. Chapman lawsuit. 
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On November 12, 2003, Judge Laycock issued a ruling in the MM Property case 
staying Mr. Whatley's cross claim against the Chapmans, but again ordering Mr. Chapman 
to submit his cross claims to arbitration. (A certified copy of Judge Laycock's order in 
the MM Property case is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit B.) Thus, Judge Laycock 
chose to stay Mr. Whatley's cross claims during the pendency of the arbitration in the MM 
Property case where she had previously chosen to dismiss the Whatley v. Chapman lawsuit 
altogether. In order to harmonize the two opinions, Judge Laycock incidentally issued a 
revised order in the Whatley v. Chapman case, also on November 12, 2003, that was 
consistent with the MM Property result by reasserting the court's jurisdiction over the 
original case during the pendency of the arbitration. It is this November 12, 2003 order 
that Mr. Whatley complains about. {See Appellant's Addendum, at 153-156.) 
If the lower court erred in issuing the November 12 order, then it is harmless error. 
In truth, Mr. Whatley does not complain about the substance of Judge Laycock's 
November 12 order. Indeed it would be foolish for him to do so because the result helps 
him; the court retains jurisdiction over Mr. Whatley's lawsuit during arbitration. Hence, 
Mr. Whatley need not file a new lawsuit or pay additional fees in order to have a judge 
review the arbitration award if he does not like that award. Furthermore, the ruling came 
about as a direct result of Mr. Whatley's re-filing of his original claims against the 
Chapmans. Thus, although Mr. Whatley makes noise about the propriety of the lower 
court's revised ruling, Mr. Whatley really has nothing to say. This issue is nothing more 
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than legal smoke and mirrors; Mr. Whatley offers no substantive argument on the issue 
nor does he suggest a solution to the perceived problem, or even explain to the Court why 
the November 12 order is a problem. The Court should therefore disregard Mr. Whatley's 
assertion that the lower court improperly issued its November 12 order. 
II. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY ORDERED MR. WHATLEY TO 
SUBMIT HIS CLAIMS TO ARBITRATION. 
The second issue raised by Mr. Whatley is whether the lower court exceeded the 
scope of the arbitration clause in the Agreement by ordering Mr. Whatley to submit all of 
his claims to arbitration. Just as he did in the lower court, Mr. Whatley continues to 
distort the plain meaning of the Agreement, not to mention Utah law, by arguing that none 
of his claims "arise under" the contract and are thus not subject to arbitration. Before 
debunking Mr. Whatley's argument, however, it is important to understand what the 
Agreement says and how Utah courts view arbitration clauses. 
A. The Agreement contains an enforceable arbitration clause. 
Paragraph 9(m) of the Agreement reads as follows: 
In the event of a dispute under this agreement, the parties agree that any 
action brought shall be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with 
the rules of the American Arbitration Association. Such arbitration need not 
be conducted by the American Arbitration Association, even though it would 
follow their rules. Arbitration proceedings shall be brought in Utah County, 
Utah, and not elsewhere. 
(Appellant's Addendum at 33, % 9(m).) Eight months after Mr. Whatley abandoned 
World-Wide Photo and stopped making payments to the Chapmans, Mr. Chapman 
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commenced arbitration proceedings with the American Arbitration Association pursuant 
to paragraph 9(m) of the Agreement. (Record, at 92; see also Appellant's Addendum at 
78.) Rather than answer the arbitration demand, Mr. Whatley filed the above-captioned 
case in the Fourth Judicial District for the State of Utah, in direct violation of paragraph 
9(m). Hence the Chapmans filed a motion to compel Mr. Whatley to submit to arbitration. 
(Record, at 122.) 
The Chapmans' motion was based on § 78-31a-4(l) of the Utah Arbitration Act, 
which says: 
The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an arbitration 
agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised 
concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the 
matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those issues and 
order or deny arbitration accordingly.1 
Clearly, the Utah Arbitration Act requires arbitration where there is an agreement to 
arbitrate. The Utah Supreme Court favors arbitration as well. In Central Florida 
Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Associates, 2002 UT 3, 40 P.3d, the Utah Supreme Court 
^his is the version of the Utah Arbitration Act that was in effect on January 10, 
2003, when the Chapmans filed their motion to compel arbitration. On May 15, 2003, 
a new Arbitration Act took effect. The corresponding provision in the new Arbitration 
Act is found at Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-108(l), which reads as follows: 
(1) On motion of a person showing an agreement to arbitrate and alleging 
another person's refusal to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement: (a) if the refusing party 
does not appear or does not oppose the motion, the court shall order the parties to 
arbitrate; and (b) if the refusing party opposes the motion, the court shall proceed 
summarily to decide the issue and order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there 
is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate. 
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said, with respect to interpreting arbitration agreements, "we interpret the agreement 
keeping in mind our policy of encouraging arbitration. 'It is the policy of the law in Utah 
to interpret contracts in favor of arbitration, 'in resolution of disputes when the parties 
have agreed not to litigate."" (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Id., at f 16. After 
considering Mr. Whatley's complaint in light of the arbitration agreement, Judge Lay cock 
ordered Mr. Whatley into arbitration, consistent with the Utah Arbitration Act and Utah's 
policy of encouraging arbitration. Unhappy with that result, Mr. Whatley is still trying 
to get out of his obligation to arbitrate. 
B. An action for breach of contract arises under the contract itself. 
According to Mr. Whatley, the arbitration requirement in paragraph 9(m) does not 
matter. Mr. Whatley argues that he is immune from the arbitration provision because none 
of his causes of action "arise under" the Agreement. This is so, argues Mr. Whately, 
because his causes of action are styled as torts, or concern the breach of the Agreement, 
and therefore cannot arise under the Agreement itself. This is all stuff and nonsense. 
It is rudimentary law that a cause of action for breach of contract arises from the 
contract itself. Section 1 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts says, "A contract is a 
promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the 
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty." The Restatement goes 
on to say, "When performance of a duty under a contract is due any non-performance is 
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a breach." (Restatement, Contracts 2d, § 235(2).) Thus, a cause of action for breach of 
contract arises from the contract itself. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Whatley argues that a cause of action for breach of contract is 
not a cause of action that would arise "under" the contract. This position flies in the face 
of logic. (As an aside, one must ask what cause of action would arise "under" a contract 
if a breach of contract cause does not.) In support of his statement, Mr. Whatley cites, but 
does not argue, the United States Supreme Court case of United States v. Utah Const. Co., 
384 U.S. 394 (1966). Utah Construction does not say what Mr. Whatley wants it to say. 
The Utah Construction case concerns a construction contract between the Atomic 
Energy Commission ("AEC"), a government agency, and Utah Construction & Mining 
Company, a private contractor. The contract at issue contained a dispute clause that said, 
"All disputes concerning questions of fact arising under this contract shall be decided by 
the contracting officer subject to written appeal by the contractor (Utah Construction) 
within 30 days to the head of the department concerned (i.e., the AEC). . . . " (Id., at fn. 
2.) In essence, under this provision, if a problem arose in the course of construction (e.g., 
an unforseen delay or increased costs), that problem had to be submitted to an 
administrative body that would make specific findings of fact about the rights of the parties 
under the circumstances. (See id., at 397-402.) However, the dispute provision gave no 
authority to the governing administrative body to deal with a claim of whether the issues 
11 
presented to it constituted a breach of contract, and, hence, it could not make a 
determination as to whether either party had breached the contract.2 {Id.) 
Of course, several problems arose in the course of construction, which Utah 
Construction submitted to the appropriate administrative body for a determination of 
rights. Utah Construction did not get the result it wanted from the administrative body and 
then sued the AEC in the Court of Claims for breach of contract. (See id.) The AEC 
argued that the dispute clause required Utah Construction to bring its breach of contract 
cause of action before the administrative body. The Supreme Court disagreed and held 
that Utah Construction's breach of contract cause of action did not "arise under" the 
dispute clause that only permitted the submission of factual disputes to an administrative 
body. In light of the provisions in the dispute clause, the Supreme Court held that the 
2The circumstances at issue in Utah Construction illustrate the distinction 
between a determination of the rights of the parties and the actual determination of 
breach of contract. In Utah Construction, a dispute of fact arose between the parties 
when Utah Construction asserted it had encountered float rock in the course of 
excavating and drilling which increased its costs and delayed its work. Whether the 
float rock had caused the increased costs was an issue of fact that the parties were 
required to put before the relevant administrative body for determination pursuant to 
the dispute clause in the contract. However, whether failure on the part of the AEC to 
pay Utah Construction's increased costs constituted a breach of contract was not for the 
administrative body to decide. That issue was required to be put before the Court of 
Claims or the District Court, which Utah Construction did. The AEC did not like this 
approach to dispute resolution and argued that all of Utah Construction's claims, 
whether for determination of rights or for breach of contract, were subject to (i.e., 
"arose from") the dispute clause and thus subject to adjudication by the relevant 
administrative body. The Supreme Court disagreed. See generally Utah Construction. 
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Court of Claims could properly hear and adjudicate Utah Construction's breach of contract 
claim. (See id., at 418.) 
Mr. Whatley wants this holding to justify his position that none of his causes of 
action "arise under" the Agreement. The Utah Construction case offers no such 
justification. The Utah Construction court never said that a cause of action for breach of 
contract is separate or divisible from the contract itself. All the Utah Construction court 
said was that the contractor was not limited to bringing its breach of contract cause of 
action before the administrative body described in the dispute clause. Furthermore, the 
decision is limited in scope to a specific dispute clause in a government contract that 
expressly provided for the administrative adjudication of the rights of the parties. 
Unlike Utah Construction, the Agreement at issue here is between two private 
parties and does not contain any provision requiring a separate adjudication of rights by 
an administrative body.3 The arbitration clause at issue here is perfectly clear on its face: 
any dispute that arises from the contract must be submitted to arbitration. Mr. Whatley's 
3For the Utah Construction case to apply here, the arbitration clause would have 
to essentially say that if a dispute arose between the parties as to a material fact, that 
dispute must be submitted to arbitration, but the issue of whether the dispute regarding 
that fact rose to the level of a contract breach could only be decided by a court of law. 
The arbitration clause does not say that. It simply says that any disputes that arise 
under the agreement must be submitted to arbitration. 
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first two causes of action for "void contract/recision" and "breach of contract" clearly 
arise under the Agreement and are subject to arbitration.4 
C. All of Mr. Whatley's other causes of action are inextricably linked to the 
Agreement, 
As for Mr. Whatley's other "tort" causes of action, they are all inextricably linked 
to the Agreement, and, after all the camouflage is stripped away, they are all causes of 
action for breach of contract as well. It has long been held that, "In characterizing a cause 
of action, Utah courts look to the nature of the action and not the pleading labels chosen. 
Accordingly, [Utah courts] are most concerned with the true nature of the wrong and the 
injury as evidenced in the substance of the pleadings." Records v. Briggs, 887 P.2d 864, 
868 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The substance of each of Mr. Whatley's so-called tort causes 
of action is that Mr. Chapman breached the Agreement. 
For example, Mr. Whatley has alleged a cause of action for breach of fiduciary 
duties. (Appellant's Addendum, at 17-19, \\ 61-69.) The cause of action alleges that Mr. 
Chapman breached his fiduciary duties after taking over the business as trustee or receiver 
on behalf of Mr. Whatley. Whatever duties Mr. Chapman owes to Mr. Whatley arise out 
of the Agreement. This cause of action would not exist but for the existence of the 
contractual obligations between the parties as specified in the Agreement. 
4Mr. Whatley's first two causes of action are actually one cause of action for 
breach of contract. In addition, "void contract" and "recision" are remedies for a 
breach of contract, not causes of action in and of themselves. 
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Likewise, Mr. Whatley's alleged cause of action for conversion/theft is tied directly 
to the Agreement. The Agreement specifically outlines what assets went with the sale of 
the business and what assets did not. (See, e.g., Appellant's Addendum, at 28, f 3.) Mr. 
Whatley's allegation that "Chapmans have retained various items of property" is just 
another way of alleging the Chapmans breached the Agreement by failing to comply with 
its asset provisions. (See Appellant's Addendum, at 19, t1 71-72.) 
Mr. Whatley's slander of title cause of action is also inextricably tied to the 
Agreement. Paragraph 2(b) of the Agreement specifically obligates Mr. Whatley to give 
the Chapmans a security interest in lots 241 and 242, Sherwood Hills Subdivision, Plat F. 
Paragraph 2(c) entitles the Chapmans to receive "the entire net sale proceeds" from the 
sale of the lots as partial satisfaction of the purchase price for World-Wide Photo. When 
Mr. Whatley abandoned the business and stopped making payments, the Chapmans 
commenced foreclosure proceedings, as they had the right to do under the terms of the 
Agreement. Mr. Whatley now alleges that those proceedings constitute slander of title, 
but what he is really alleging is that the Chapmans have breached the Agreement and have 
no right to foreclose. Thus this cause of action is really a breach of contract cause of 
action in slander-of-title clothing. 
The same is true of Mr. Whatley's alleged causes of action for defamation (which 
arose from a public hearing held before the Utah Labor Commission regarding a complaint 
filed by one of Mr. Whatley's former employees, which employee he would not have had 
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were it not for the Agreement), tortious interference with business (the Agreement contains 
a non-competition clause - see Appellant's Addendum, at 29, \ 5), and violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1030 (which is also tied to the non-competition clause of the Agreement). None 
of these causes of action exceed the scope of the arbitration clause contained in the 
Agreement; all of them are breach of contract causes of action; all of them "arise under" 
the Agreement; and they are all subject to arbitration, just as Judge Lay cock said. 
D. Mr. Whatley's fraud allegation is not a "get out of arbitration free" card. 
In addition, Mr. Whatley has alleged that the Chapmans and Mr. Christensen have 
defrauded him. Mr. Whatley sees his fraud cause of action (which is divided into two 
sections, "contractual fraud" and "stock fraud") as a get out of arbitration free card. Mr. 
Whatley's argument is based on § 78-3la-3 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended), which says, "A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy 
to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law 
or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as provided in the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure." Unfortunately for Mr. Whatley, he has not alleged fraud as required 
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires Mr. Whatley to plead fraud 
against each of the defendants with particularity. Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure requires Mr. Whatley to plead fraud with particularity.5 As the Utah Supreme 
Court explained in Heathman v. Hatch, 372 P.2d 990, 992 (Utah 1962), 
The objective of [Rules 8 and 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] is to 
require that the essential facts upon which redress is sought be set forth with 
simplicity, brevity, clarity and certainty so that it can be determined whether 
there exists a legal basis for the relief claimed; and, if so, so that there will 
be a clearly defined foundation upon which further proceedings by way of 
responsive pleading and/or trial can go forward in an orderly manner. 
In addition, it has long been recognized in Utah that where the terms " 'fraud,' 'conspiracy' 
and 'negligence' are but general accusation in the nature of conclusions of the pleader 
[t]hey will not stand up against a motion to dismiss on that ground. The basic facts must 
be set forth with sufficient particularity to show what facts are claimed to constitute such 
charges." Id., at 991. Mr. Whatley's allegations of fraud fail to rise to this level. He 
has utterly failed to plead fraud against Mr. Christensen, and he has failed to do so against 
the Chapmans as well.6 
5Rule 9(b) says: "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, 
knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally." 
6Mr. Whatley attempts to show in his brief that he has pleaded fraud with 
particularity by creating a table showing the elements of fraud coupled with the 
paragraphs in his complaint where he thinks he has alleged particularly pleaded fraud. 
(Appellant's brief, at 13.) Interestingly, four of the nine paragraphs Mr. Whatley cites 
(ft 13, 18, 20 and 72) do not even appear in the context of the fraud cause of action 
itself. What is more, Mr. Whatley does not cite the language of any of the paragraphs 
themselves, because he knows they are too general to stand up to the particularity 
requirements described in Rule 9 and in Semenov v. Hill, 1999 UT 58, 982 P.2d 578. 
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1. Mr. Whatley has no basis for his fraud claim against Mr. Christensen. 
In Semenov v. Hill, 1999 UT 58, j 9, 982 P.2d 578, the Utah Supreme Court said: 
Under Utah law, to bring a claim sounding in fraud, a party must allege (1) 
that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing material 
fact (3) which was false and (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be 
false or (b) made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge 
upon which to base such representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the 
other party to act upon it and (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and 
in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby 
induced to act (9) to that party's injury and damage. (Citations omitted.) 
Hence, under Semenov, Mr. Whatley must specifically plead, with respect to Mr. 
Christensen: (1) that Mr. Christensen made a representation (2) concerning a presently 
existing material fact (3) which was false and (4) which Mr. Christensen either (a) knew 
to be false or (b) made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon 
which to base such representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing Mr. Whatley to act upon 
it and (6) that Mr. Whatley, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did in fact 
rely upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to that his injury and damage. See 
Semenov v. Hill, at if 9. 
Mr. Whatley has utterly failed to plead these nine elements with respect to Mr. 
Christensen (and with respect to the Chapmans for that matter). 
a. Mr. Whatley has not alleged, nor can he show that Mr. Christensen was 
a party to or signed off on the Stock and Asset Purchase and Sale Agreement. There 
is no nexus linking Mr. Christensen to the transaction that might give rise to the possibility 
of fraud on Mr. Christensen's part. Mr. Christensen did not sign the agreement; there is 
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no allegation to the contrary. Mr. Christensen only participated in the transaction as an 
attorney for Mr. Chapman, no more nor less than Mr. Willardson participated as counsel 
for Mr. Whatley. Both attorneys participated in drafting the agreement and in counseling 
their clients. {See Appellant's Addendum, at 118-119, ft 30-31.) That the parties are 
now trading allegations of breach of contract does not equate to fraud on the part of the 
attorneys. 
b. Mr. Whatley has not alleged nor can he show that Mr. Christensen 
personally made any sort of direct representation to Mr. Whatley himself that 
induced him to sign off on the agreement. Indeed, Mr. Whatley admits in the affidavit 
he filed that he has never spoken with Mr. Christensen. Paragraph 31 of Mr. Whatley's 
affidavit says, "Christensen may not have met or spoken with me directly, but he did the 
drafting and it was his changes that Chapman discussed with me and insisted upon 
implementing." (Emphasis added.) (Appellant's Addendum at 119, f 31.) Thus, by Mr. 
Whatley's own admission, the representation element under Semenov is lacking and Mr. 
Whatley has no case against Mr. Christensen for fraud. 
c. Mr. Whatley has not alleged nor can he show that Mr. Christensen gave 
any independent opinion or representation to Mr. Whatley on which Mr. Whatley 
relied to his detriment. Perhaps if Mr. Christensen had issued an independent opinion 
letter to Mr. Whatley that Mr. Whatley relied on in his purchase of World-Wide Photo, 
there might be some basis for Mr. Whatley's fraud claim. There is no such letter, nor is 
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there any other independent representation from Mr. Christensen to Mr. Whatley or Mr. 
Willardson, for that matter, where Mr. Christensen made demonstrably false assertions 
about World-Wide Photo that induced Mr. Whatley to consummate the transaction. The 
opinion letter does not exist; the representations do not exist; most importantly, the 
allegations do not exist. Hence Mr. Whately's cause of action for fraud against Mr. 
Christensen must fail and were properly dismissed. 
d. Mr. Whatley has not alleged, nor can he show that Mr. Christensen is 
part of or a front for World-Wide Photo (the company Mr. Chapman sold to Mr. 
Whatley). Mr. Whatley's fraud allegations against Mr. Christensen might also make sense 
if Mr. Whatley could show that Mr. Christensen was a part of World-Wide Photo (e.g., 
a shareholder) or that he had direct knowledge of the inner workings of the corporation. 
There is no such allegation because Mr. Christensen is not now nor has he ever been a 
shareholder in, or a part of World-Wide Photo. There is no evidence, or even any 
allegation that Mr. Christensen had direct knowledge of the inner workings of World-Wide 
Photo, that he was privy to the books, or knew the financial situation of the company. 
Instead, Mr. Christensen did what lawyers always do - he reasonably relied on the 
representations of his client in negotiating the terms of an agreement between his client and 
Mr. Whatley (who was also represented by counsel through the entire negotiation period). 
This does not put Mr. Christensen in a position to defraud Mr. Whatley. Mr. Whatley has 
not even alleged that Mr. Christensen was somehow a "front" for Mr. Chapman. The 
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allegations have not been made because the facts and evidence to support them simply do 
not exist. 
Rather than make any of the above showings, Mr. Whatley vaguely alleges that Mr. 
Christensen has committed fraud because Mr. Christensen participated in drafting a 
document and conveyed Mr. Chapman's wishes.7 This is not pleading with particularity 
for the purposes of alleging fraud. Indeed, only three paragraphs in Mr. Whatley's 
complaint (paragraphs 11, 49 and 56) even refer to Mr. Christensen by name with respect 
to the fraud allegations. In the introduction portion of the complaint, Mr. Whatley says, 
in paragraph 11: 
t i l . On or about April 5, 2001, Mr. Whatley and Chapmans entered into 
an agreement entitled "Stock and Asset Purchase and Sale." That document 
was drafted bv defendant Christensen. . . . (Appellant's Addendum, at 3.) 
Then, in Count III, labeled "Fraud,", Mr. Whatley alleges as follows: 
7Ironically, Mr. Whatley fills fourteen pages in his affidavit describing his 
interaction with Mr. Chapman and describing how he thinks Mr. Chapman has 
misbehaved. Then, on the bottom of the thirteenth page, comes the remarkable 
statement, "Mr. Christensen has been the prime mover in all of the activities of 
Defendants." (Appellant's Addendum, at 118, \ 29.) The statement is immediately 
followed by, "Discovery is needed, however, on the precise extent of his 
involvement." {Id.) Defendants are not aware of any cause of action for being a 
"prime mover," nor does Mr. Whatley explain what a "prime mover" is. 
Furthermore, the allegation in Mr. Whatley's affidavit that Mr. Christensen is the 
"prime mover" is in direct contradiction to the allegation in paragraph 12 of his 
complaint, where Mr. Whatley expressly says, "Mr. Chapman was, at all times 
relevant hereto, and remains, the prime mover in the operation of that business. 
(Emphasis added.) {Id., at 3, \ 12.) Mr. Whatley cannot have it both ways. 
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149. The above actions began occurring within a very short time of signing 
the agreements. Plaintiff therefore alleges, on information and belief, that 
Mr. Chapman had no intention of honoring those promises at the time they 
were made. Those contractual representations, warranties, and promises 
were conveyed and drafted by Mr. Christensen. assisting Mr. Chapman's 
fraud, (/rf., at 13-14.) 
Finally, Mr. Whatley alleges in paragraph 56: 
f 56. The statement that Mr. Whatley was contracting to purchase the 
"outstanding shares" of the corporation appears multiple times in the 
document which Mr. Christensen drafted and which the Chapmans signed. 
It is entitled "stock and asset purchase and sale." Mr. Whatley requested the 
stock records and corporate records and was initially told they would be 
produced. Ultimately Mr. Chapman admitted there were none. On 
information and belief the named defendants either knew or should have 
known that the contractual representation regarding stock and corporate 
records were false when made. (Id., at 16.) 
In short, Mr. Whatley alleges with specificity that Mr. Christensen drafted documents and 
conveyed Mr. Chapman's representations. These allegations do not begin to satisfy the 
nine elements of fraud set forth in Semenov. Judge Laycock recognized the complaint 
merely alleges Mr. Christensen was acting as the Chapmans' attorney and correctly 
dismissed the complaint against Mr. Christensen. 
2. Mr. Whatley's fraud cause of action against the Chapmans is just 
another allegation of breach of contract. 
As for Mr. Whatley' fraud cause of action against the Chapmans, not only has he 
failed the particularity test, the fraud cause of action is inextricably linked to the 
Agreement, and is really a cause of action for breach of contract, just like all of his other 
causes of action. In Records v. Briggs (see supra), the Utah Court of Appeals observed, 
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The Utah Supreme Court has followed the rule that 'if the cause of action 
arises from a breach of a promise set forth in the contract the action is ex 
contractu (from or out of a contract), but if it arises from a breach of a duty 
growing out 0/the contract it is ex delicto (from a delict or tort).' (Citations 
omitted.) 
Records, at 869. Mr. Whatley's fraud cause of action essentially alleges that the 
representations made by the Chapmans in the Agreement were false. Thus, the fraud 
cause of action is ex contractu, because it arises from the Agreement itself and, like all of 
Mr. Whatley's "tort" causes of action, is just another breach of contract cause of action. 
Thus Judge Lay cock held that Mr. Whtaley's so-called fraud cause of action is not a free 
pass out of his obligation to arbitrate. There is no reason for this Court to depart from that 
holding. 
E. The Pacific Development case cited by Mr, Whatley is inapposite to this case. 
Finally, Mr. Whatley argues that none of the causes of action raised in his 
complaint are within the scope of the arbitrator's authority to decide, hence Mr. Whatley 
is excused from arbitration. In support of this argument, Mr. Whatley has extensively 
quoted Pacific Development v. Orton, 2001 UT 36, 23 P.3d 1035 (Utah 2001) for the 
proposition that an arbitrator cannot give an award that exceeds the scope of the arbitration 
clause. Here again, Mr. Whatley has twisted the holding in Pacific Development for his 
own purposes. 
In Pacific Development, the plaintiff contracted with defendant to do sewer, water 
and storm drain work on two plats within a subdivision. A dispute arose between the 
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parties over the amount of work performed and defendant filed a mechanic's lien against 
the project and litigation ensued. See id., at 1 2. According to Justice Durrant, 
"Apparently, the underlying contract between the parties required them to arbitrate 
disputes. This fact was mentioned in oral argument, although neither party has provided 
an addendum of the relevant contract provision nor cited to any portion of the record 
where it may be found." Id., at fn. 1. 
The parties settled many of their disputes without going to arbitration, but were 
unable to resolve a dispute with regard to one of the plats. The parties then entered into 
a second, written arbitration agreement that limited the scope of the arbitration to resolving 
the issue over one of the two plats. See id., at 1 2. After the arbitration, the arbitrator 
issued an award that covered both plats. See id. Under these circumstances, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the arbitrator exceeded his authority when he issued an award for 
both plats instead of limiting the award to the plat subject to the second, narrow arbitration 
agreement. Id., at f 14. 
The circumstances of Pacific Development are inapposite to this case. The Pacific 
Development case started with a global arbitration agreement that was later revised and 
whittled down to cover a very narrow issue. The arbitration clause in the Agreement in 
this case is global and, by its terms, requires all disputes that arise under the Agreement 
to be submitted to arbitration. As demonstrated above, all of Mr. Whatley's causes of 
action fall within the broad language of the arbitration clause, and the arbitrator has 
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authority to issue an award with regard to the entire case. Judge Laycock agreed and even 
went so far as to say: 
[T]he Court finds that it is clear, when looking at the entire complaint in 
context, paragraph by paragraph, that everything Plaintiff complains of in his 
complaint is based on the contract and arises under the contract. The Court 
further finds that Plaintiffs argument that his causes of action do not arise 
under the agreement is, in some respects, subterfuge to try to get around his 
contractual obligation to arbitrate. 
(Addendum Exhibit A, f 9; see also Hearing Transcript, page 59, attached to Appellant's 
Addendum, at 140.) Judge Laycock was not fooled by Mr. Whatley's subterfuge. This 
Court should not be fooled either. 
Ill, THE COURT PROPERLY TREATED APPELLEE'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS AS A MOTION TO DISMISS, NOT A MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Mr. Whatley next argues that the lower court could not properly dismiss his 
complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) because the court must accept all the allegations in the 
complaint as true for the purposes of Rule 12(b)(6). (Appellant's brief, at 9.) What Mr. 
Whatley fails to point out to the Court is that Judge Laycock did accept all of the 
allegations as true. Mr. Whatley is frustrated because he lost anyway and must now 
submit to arbitration. 
In the course of briefing the motion to dismiss and motion to compel arbitration, 
Mr. Chapman submitted an affidavit in support of the motion to compel arbitration. 
(Appellant's Addendum, at 54.) Judge Laycock purposely and expressly ignored Mr. 
Chapman's affidavit and looked exclusively to the complaint in considering both the 
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motion to compel arbitration and the motion to dismiss Mr. Whatley's complaint. Said the 
judge: 
12 [T]he Court has not relied on the affidavit of Mr. Chapman in making 
its decision with regard to Defendants' motion to dismiss, but has looked to 
the allegations made in the complaint, and the provisions of the contract 
between the parties. Hence, the Court declines to treat either of Defendants' 
motions as motions for summary judgment, and, for the purposes of this 
ruling, accepts the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint as true. See St. 
Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 
(Utah 1991) ("A rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in 
the complaint but challenges the plaintiff's right to relief based on those 
facts.") 
(Addendum Exhibit A, at if 2.) In substance, the facts that arise out of the complaint 
which must be taken as true are: 1) that Mr. Whatley and the Chapmans entered into an 
agreement with respect to the sale of World-Wide Photo; 2) that the Chapmans have not 
done all that the Agreement requires of them; and 3) paragraph 9(m) of the Agreement 
requires the parties to submit "any action" to arbitration "in the event of a dispute under 
this agreement." (Appellant's Addendum, at 33.) Judge Lay cock dismissed the lawsuit 
and ordered the parties into arbitration because she was required to accept the facts alleged 
in the complaint as true. Paragraph 9(m) requires the parties to submit to arbitration, 
period, the end. There is no way to construe the contractual obligation to arbitrate in favor 
of Mr. Whatley and not order the parties to attend arbitration. Judge Laycock was 
therefore correct to dismiss Mr. Whatley's complaint.8 
8Mr. Whatley also argues that Judge Laycock made the wrong decision even if 
the motion to dismiss is treated as a motion for summary judgment. This argument is 
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IV. THE COURT'S DENIAL OF THE RULE 56(f) MOTION WAS PROPER. 
Finally, Mr. Whatley argues that it was improper for Judge Lay cock to deny his 
Rule 56(f) motion for additional time to do discovery. Here again, Mr. Whatley is wrong. 
A. Discovery is already occurring in the arbitration proceeding. Hence, Mr. 
Whatley will not be prejudiced by the denial of his Rule 56(f) motion. 
Mr. Whately's Rule 56(f) motion is a red herring. Mr. Whatley argues he has been 
denied his right to do discovery due to the denial of his Rule 56(f) motion. This is 
nonsense. Mr. Whatley has every right to pursue discovery in the context of the 
arbitration. The only difference between doing discovery in arbitration as opposed to a 
civil suit is that Mr. Whatley can do discovery cheaper and quicker in arbitration if he is 
so inclined. The arbitration is being conducted by the American Arbitration Association 
("AAA"), pursuant to the commercial rules promulgated by AAA. Rule R-23 of the 
commercial rules of arbitration specifically requires the parties to exchange information.9 
meaningless, for the standard for granting motions for summary judgment under Rule 
56(c) is the same if not lower than the standard under Rule 12(b)(6). No matter how 
the Agreement is parsed Mr. Whatley cannot get around paragraph 9(m). Again, the 
undisputed facts are there is an agreement that requires the parties to submit to 
arbitration. The reasonable inferences drawn in favor of Mr. Whatley are that the 
Chapmans breached the agreement. Therefore, under paragraph 9(m), the parties must 
submit to arbitration. Judge Laycock did nothing more nor less than enforce the 
arbitration agreement, as she was required to do. 
9Rule R-23 says: Exchange of Information 
1. At the request of any party or at the discretion of the arbitrator, consistent with 
the expedited nature of arbitration, the arbitrator may direct (i) the production of 
documents and other information, and (ii) the identification of any witnesses to 
be called. 
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Furthermore, Mr. Whatley is permitted to do discovery in the arbitration proceeding just 
as if it were a state-court proceeding, with the same rights, privileges and restrictions. 
Mr. Whately is not prejudiced at all by the denial his Rule 56(f) motion. 
In fact, Mr. Whatley admits in his opening brief that he is cooperating in the 
arbitration proceedings. (See Appellant's brief, at 5-6.) The arbitration is over a year old. 
In that time, the parties have done substantial discovery through several document requests 
and inspections10 and a final hearing date has been set and postponed twice due to the 
parties desire to do additional discovery. The Chapmans have complied with each of Mr. 
Whatley's discovery requests and discovery is nearing completion. The parties will shortly 
be ready to reset the hearing date. There is no reason to bring the arbitration process to 
a screeching halt just so Mr. Whatley can pursue his Rule 56(f) motion in the trial court 
to do discovery that is already all but completed. 
B. Rule 56(f) is not a fishing licence. 
In addition, Mr. Whatley filed his Rule 56(f) motion hoping to convince the court 
that he should be allowed to discover what fraud, if any, was committed against him by 
Mr. Christensen and Mr. Chapman. The Rule 56(f) motion is crucial to Mr. Whatley's 
2. At least five (5) business days prior to the hearing, the parties shall exchange 
copies of all exhibits they intend to submit at the hearing. 
3. The arbitrator is authorized to resolve any disputes concerning the exchange of 
information. 
10Mr. Whatley has been to World-Wide Photo's premises twice to inspect 
documents in the past six months. 
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case against Mr. Christensen, in particular, because fraud is the only cause of action Mr. 
Whatley can pursue against an opposing attorney.11 In truth, Mr. Whatley is on a fishing 
expedition to see if he can somehow prove Mr. Christensen defrauded him or participated 
with Mr. Chapman in defrauding him. Utah law does not allow Mr. Whatley to do what 
he is trying to do. 
As observed above, Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires Mr. 
Whatley to plead fraud with particularity, which he has utterly failed to do. Nevertheless, 
Mr. Whatley now wants to go forward under the guise of Rule 56(f) to see if he can find 
anything that amounts to fraud. Under the Heathman opinion {see supra), Mr. Whatley 
is doing things backwards. The Heathman court said that a plaintiff must first plead fraud 
with particularity so that then "there will be a clearly defined foundation upon which 
further proceedings. . . can go forward. . . . " Heathman, at 992. Mr. Whately is trying 
to get to the further proceedings without first laying a clearly defined foundation. Under 
Heathman, Mr. Whatley's complaint is subject to dismissal and he is not entitled to further 
proceedings under Rule 56(f). 
11
 See 7 Am Jur 2d, Attorneys at Law, § 249: "While generally an attorney's 
professional duty of care extends only to dealings with his or her own client and to 
intended beneficiaries of the legal work performed, these limitations upon liability for 
negligence based upon the scope of the attorney's duty do not apply to liability for 
fraud. If an attorney is actuated by malicious motives or shares the illegal motives of 
his or her client, the attorney may be personally liable with the client for damage 
suffered by a third person as a result of the attorney's actions." 
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The purpose of discovery is to obtain evidence that supports the clearly-stated 
allegations in a complaint, not to try to create facts out of thin air, which is exactly what 
Mr. Whatley is trying to do. As a practical matter, if this Court were to allow Mr. 
Whatley to go forward and "discover" whether Mr. Christensen committed fraud when 
there are no specific allegations of fraud, then every attorney who participates in contract 
negotiations is subject to liability for fraud as soon as the contract falls apart. Attorneys 
are in the business of drafting documents and zealously representing their clients. The 
rules of ethics require such zealous representation.12 No attorney will be able to zealously 
represent a client if he or she can be sued at the drop of a hat for fraud if the contract 
between clients suddenly goes south. 
Because Mr. Whatley has not alleged fraud against Mr. Christensen or the 
Chapmans with particularity and because Mr. Whatley is entitled to do discovery in the 
context of the arbitration anyway, Judge Lay cock properly denied Mr. Whatley's Rule 
56(f) motion. 
CONCLUSION 
In April 2001, Mr. Whatley purchased World-Wide Photo from the Chapmans. A 
year later, with only a few days' warning, Mr. Whately abandoned the business and 
refused to pay the Chapmans as he agreed to do. Mr. Whatley then refused to participate 
l2See Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.1 (Competence) and Rule 1.3 
(Diligence) ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client."). 
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in the arbitration proceeding commenced by the Chapmans as required by paragraph 9(m) 
of the Agreement. Instead, apparently pursuing the best-defense-is-a-good-offense 
approach, Mr. Whatley sued the Chapmans and their attorney for breach of contract and 
a host of other alleged wrongs. For some reason, Mr. Whatley believes that the Chapmans 
should be held accountable under the Agreement, but he is relieved from performing under 
that same Agreement. Mr. Whatley is wrong. 
Clearly there is a dispute between the parties as to who breached the Agreement. 
If this Court were to follow Mr. Whatley's suggestion, then the parties would only 
arbitrate the Chapmans' claims against Mr. Whatley because those claims "arise under" 
the Agreement, according to Mr. Whatley. The parties would then turn around and litigate 
Mr. Whatley's claims, which Mr. Whatley says do not arise under the Agreement, in the 
fourth district court. This solution is unworkable, not to mention unreasonable. The 
Agreement requires the parties to arbitrate their disputes. This Court should not allow Mr. 
Whatley to get out of that obligation where every single cause of action contained in his 
complaint boils down to a simple allegation that the Chapmans breached the Agreement. 
The Court should therefore deny Mr. Whatley's appeal and remand this case back to the 
fourth district court pending the outcome of the arbitration proceedings. 
DATED this 31st day of December, 2003. 
CORBWDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
James L. Christensen 
Christopher G. Jessop 
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CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2705 
Telephone: 801/534-0909 
Fax: 801/534-1948 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
BRYAN J. WHATLEY, an individual, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
BRUCE E. CHAPMAN, CERI 
CHAPMAN, JAMES L. CHRISTENSEN, 
and DOES I-V, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTIONS AND DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S RULE 56(f) MOTION 
Civil No. 020405636 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
The following motions came on regularly for hearing before this Court on Wednesday, 
February 26, 2003, at 10:30 a.m.: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, dated January 10, 2003; 
2. Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration, dated January 10, 2003; and 
3. Plaintiffs Motion for Relief Under Rule Rule 56(f), dated January 23, 2003. 
Plaintiff Bryan J. Whatley was present at the hearing and was represented by his attorney, 
Timothy Miguel Willardson. Defendants Bruce E. Chapman, Ceri Chapman ("Chapmans") and 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
4-^77 )^ ^ r - ^ Deputy 
James L. Christensen were also present and were represented by their attorneys, James L. 
Christensen and Christopher G. Jessop. The Court, having considered the memoranda, affidavits, 
oral argument of counsel, and all relevant pleadings and documents pertaining to the motions, now 
makes the following findings and enters the following order: 
FINDINGS 
I. The effect of the affidavits of Mr. Chapman and Mr, Whatley. 
11 After reviewing the affidavit of Mr. Chapman, and considering the arguments of the 
parties, the Court finds that Mr. Chapman's affidavit was submitted exclusively in support of 
Defendants' motion to compel arbitration. 
12 Furthermore, the Court has not relied on the affidavit of Mr. Chapman in making its 
decision with regard to Defendants' motion to dismiss, but has looked to the allegations made in 
the complaint, and the provisions of the contract between the parties. Hence, the Court declines 
to treat either of Defendants' motions as motions for summary judgment, and, for the purposes 
of this ruling, accepts the allegations in Plaintiffs complaint as true. See St. Benedict's 
Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) ("A rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in the complaint but challenges the plaintiffs right to 
relief based on those facts.") 
II. Motion to Compel Arbitration 
f 3 According to the allegations in Plaintiffs complaint, Plaintiff and the Chapmans entered 
into an agreement entitled Stock and Asset Purchase and Sale ("Agreement"), on or about April 
5, 2001, that was to transfer ownership and control of a photographic business, World-Wide 
2 
Photo, Inc., from the Chapmans to Mr. Whatley. (Complaint, f 11.) The Agreement contains 
an arbitration clause that reads as follows: 
In the event of a dispute under this agreement, the parties agree that any action 
brought shall be submitted to binding arbitration in accordance with the rules of the 
American Arbitration Association. Such arbitration need not be conducted by the 
American Arbitration Association, even though it would follow their rules. 
Arbitration proceedings shall be brought in Utah County, Utah, and not elsewhere. 
(Complaint, Exhibit A, f 9(m).) 
f4 The Court finds that the arbitration clause is clear on its face and is binding upon the 
parties. 
15 The Court finds that Counts 1 and 2 of Plaintiffs complaint, titled "Void 
contract/recission," and "Breach of Contract" respectively, are breach of contract causes of action 
that arise under the Agreement. 
f 6 With regard to Count 3 of Plaintiff s complaint, titled "Fraud," the court finds that Plaintiff 
has made no any facts with particularity supporting the elements in this cause of action, and that 
this cause of action, including the sub-cause of action for "stock fraud," is really a breach of 
contract cause of action, that arises under the Agreement. 
17 The Court finds that Count 4 ("Breach of Fiduciary Duties"), Count 5 
("Conversion/Theft"), Count 6 ("Slander of Title"), Count 7 ("Defamation") and Count 8 
("Tortious Interference With Business") are all, in substance, breach of contract causes of action 
that arise under the Agreement, and that none of these causes of action would exist but for the 
Agreement between Mr. Whatlev and the Chapmans. 
3 
|8 With regard to Count 9 of Plaintiffs complaint ("Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030") the 
court finds that when taken as true, Count 9 only directly applies to the Chapmans' son, who is 
not a party to the lawsuit, and that this cause of action is a breach of contract cause of action that 
arises under the Agreement in any case. 
K9 In addition, the Court finds that it is clear, when looking at the entire complaint in context, 
paragraph by paragraph, that everything Plaintiff complains of in his complaint is based on the 
contract and arises under the contract. The Court further finds that Plaintiffs argument that his 
causes of action do not arise under the agreement is, in some respects, subterfuge to try to get 
around his contractual obligation to arbitrate. 
f 10 The Court further finds that the parties agreed to submit any action with regard to the 
contract to arbitration, and that the arbitration clause is enforceable as a matter of law. 
III. MOTION TO DISMISS 
f 11 With regard to Defendants' motion to dismiss as to Mr. Christensen, after scrutinizing the 
complaint, and putting aside the statements made in their memoranda and at oral argument by both 
parties that go beyond the complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plead the elements 
of fraud with sufficient particularity to escape dismissal, which elements are as follows: 
(1) that a representation was made (2) concerning a presently existing material fact 
(3) which was false and (4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false or (b) 
made recklessly, knowing that there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representation, (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it 
and (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, (7) did 
in fact rely upon it (8) and was thereby induced to act (9) to that party's injury and 
damage. 
Semenov v. Hill, 1999 UT 58, f 9, 982 P.2d 578. 
4 
f 12 The Court finds no allegations in the complaint that Mr. Christensen made representations 
to anyone other than his own clients, as their advisor and counsel. The only substantive allegation 
made in Plaintiffs complaint is that Mr. Christensen acted as an attorney for his clients. 
f 13 Consequently, the Court finds that there is no basis for the inclusion of Mr. Christensen 
as a party to the lawsuit. 
ORDER 
Based on the Court's findings, the Court hereby orders as follows: 
114 Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted with respect to Mr. Christensen for Plaintiffs 
failure to plead any facts that justify Mr. Christensen's inclusion as a party to the lawsuit. 
f 15 Defendants motion to dismiss is granted with respect to the remaining defendants because 
the arbitration clause in the Agreement is clear on its face and enforceable against the parties. 
1fl6 Plaintiffs motion for relief under Rule 56(f) is hereby denied. 
1fl7 Defendants' motion to compel arbitration is granted, and, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-31a-4(l), the Court orders the Plaintiff and Defendants to submit all of their claims with respect 
to the Agreement, including all of Plaintiffs causes of action raised in the complaint, to 
arbitration. 
118 The Court has discretion under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-4 to dismiss or stay this lawsuit 
pending the outcome of arbitration. Given the Court's findings, the lawsuit is hereby dismissed 
as all of Plaintiffs claims arise under the contract between Plaintiff and the Chapmans, and are 
subject to a valid, binding arbitration clause. 
5 
A 
DATED this WUday of April, 2003. 
Approved as to form and substance: 
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
James L. Christensen 
Christopher G. Jessop 
BY THE COURT: 
^UA^^t€^ 
The Honorable Judg 
Fourth District Court 
Timothy Miguel WiUardson, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, 
and faxed to the following at the address(es) indicated on the //T"~day of April, 2003. 
Timothy Miguel Willardson 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Facsimile: 576-1960 
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MM PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, L.C., 
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WORLD-WIDE PHOTO, INC., and BRYAN 
J. WHATLEY, 
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BRYAN J. WHATLEY, 
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V. 
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RULING ON DEFENDANT 
CHAPMANS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
CROSS-CLAIM AND MOTION TO 
COMPEL ARBITRATION 
Date: November 10,2001 
Case No. 030400447 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Division 5 
This matter comes before the Court on defendants Bruce Chapman's and Ceri Chapman's 
(collectively Chapmans) Motion to DismisTMr.lJVhdiley's Cross Claims*Against Bruce and Ceri 
Chavman and their Motion to CompelWbitrbdoh:^ThcsGthotions ^ ere fully briefed and 
submitted to'fce Court on SaembeW 0, 2 & B & £ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
(Whafley) Requested oral ar^ijientJ^^^^Wotioiis^e^ourt h^beenfliorou^ily'educated by| 
r ,On August 27,2003 counsellor plaintiff MM Property Management, L.C.Y a non-
moving party, filed a notice to submit for the above two motions and forclefendant Chapmans 
Motion for Sanctions Against Bryan Whatley and His Counsel, Timothy Willardson. This notice 
to submit was improperly filed early under Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A timel) 
notice to submit was filed on September 10,2003 by defendant Chapmans, which deliberately 
excluded the motion for sanctions from the matters submitted to the Court. As defendant 
Chapmans' motion for sanctions is not presently before the Court, it will not be ruled upon. 
1 
the memoranda submitted by the parties, has reviewed the file of the companion case, Bryan J. 
Whatley v. Bruce E. Chapman, ex. au ^our me no. UZU^UDO^O- neremaner wnauey v. L,napman), 
and the transcript of the motions hearing in that same matter, and finds that further oral argument 
is unnecessary, as these arguments regarding arbitration have heard and addressed by this Court 
in the companion case. Having read the memoranda and being duly intormed therefrom, the 
Court now enters the following ruling. 
RELEVAIN i ^At 1 fc ana jrKUU&DUKAL JUI&IUKY 
1. MM Property Management, L.C., ("plaintiff") filed this suit on July 31,2003 against 
defendant World-Wide Photo (World-Wide Photo^ alleging breach of contract and the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, based on a lease agreement between plaintiff and World-Wide 
Photo, dated April 2,2i)U2 and signed bv Wiiatlev in an individual capacitv. 
i. w nn me consent oi w ona- w me rnoto, piaintitt mea a t irst Am enaea complaint on 
June 26, 2003 that added Whatley as a defendant in the suit. 
t3. On July 16,2003 Whatley filed an answer that also contained a cross-claim against v 
tChatomans (who were not yet mvolved,in this lawsuit), out noteMams^aefeadant World-Wideji 
ess* 
4. On July 21,2003 Whatley ^ filed his AnsweK&*lMW^MW^^im, which 
! ^ l u ^ a cross-claim against Chapmans'and World-lViS^li^^ 
2Whatley persists in referring to his action against the Chapmans as a cross-claim, even 
quoting Rule 13(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in his Opposition to Motion to Compel 
Arbitration: "A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-party 
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action 
2 
5. The cross-claim asserts nine claims against Chapmans. 
6. On August 7,2003, shortly after the cross-claim was filed, Chapmans filed their 
Motion to Dismiss Mr. Whatley's Cross Claims Against Bruce and Ceri Chapman and their 
Motion to Compel Arbitration. 
7. On August 11,2003, plaintiff filed a document entitled Plaintiff, MM Property's 
Answering Memorandum to Defendant's motion to Compel Arbitration^ in which it stated that it 
did not oppose Chapmans5 motions for dismissal and arbitration. 
9. Defendant Whatley filed memoranda in opposition to Chapmans' motions on August 
18, 2003 and again on August 21,2003. 
10. On August 28,2003 Chapmans filed their reply memoranda. 
11. Both the motion to dismiss and the motion to corrmel arbitration were qnbmitted to 
the Court by Chapmans on September 10, 2003. 
12. Whatley is currently involved in litigation against Chapmans in a separate lawsuit 
captioned Whatley v. Chapman] fit al., our file no. 020405636 
13. me cqmpiaini mjynaueyjv.junapman,aiec^on uecember 21,2002^aU^geSitliejsame 
nine claims against ^ Chapmans. 
or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property'that is thelsubject matter of thg drfgifialfS 
action..." The Court notes that the Chapmans are not co-parties with WhMley, wliois only a cb 
party with World-Wide Photo. Whatley has properly filed a cross-claim against co-party World-
Wide Photo, but his claim against the Chapmans is a third-party claim under Rule 14 As to 
third-party defendants Chapmans, Whatley is a third-party plaintiff. Nevertheless, for simplicity 
in ruling on this motion, the Court will refer to Whatley's action against the Chapmans as a 
cross-claim, as none of the parties has attempted to correct the record up to this point. 
14. Whatley's cross-claim in the present matter is nearly identical to the claims found in 
the December 21,2002 complaint filed by Whatley in Whatley v. Chapman. 
15. In its April 29,2003 ruling in Whatley v. Chapman, the Court ordered the parties to 
engage in arbitration for all counts of the complaint. The Court found that all of defendant 
Whatley's causes of action were based upon a contract between the parties, which contained an 
enforceable arbitration provision. The Court also erroneously dismissed the Chapmans and Does 
I-V from the lawsuit. 
16. Whatley timely appealed the Court's order compelling arbitration. That matter is 
before the Utah Court of Appeals, case no. 20030481-CA. 
17. On this same date, November 10,2003, the Court has issued a ruling and order in 
Whatley v. Chapman, setting aside the order wrhich dismissed the causes of action against Bruce 
E. Chapman, Ceri Chapman, and Does I-V. Instead, the causes of action against those 
defendants are merely stayed pending arbitration. All other portions of the April 29,2003 order 
remain in effect 
DISCUSSION 
I. Chapmans' Motion to Dismiss Mr;mffiw'sVmimaim¥A^ 
Chapman 
Chapmans' motion to dismiss is based SpdS^UM^Ruleldf Civil PrdceduK12(bY6) andt 
the arbitration clause touna in me April :>, zuui contract, wmcn is tne subject oi mis cross-ciami; 
they ask that the Court dismiss defendant Whatley's cross-claim for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted. The Court finds that defendant Whatley has alleged facts and legal 
4 
theories that, if proven true, would entitle him to relief. Therefore, the Court finds no basis to 
grant Chapmans' motion, based upon the strict language of Rule 12(b)(6). 
However, the Court considers the doctrines of res judicata and claim preclusion with 
regard to Whatley's cross-claim in this matter and his amended complaint in Whatley v. 
Chapman. Res judicata and claim preclusion are doctrines recognized in Utah that prevent a 
party from prosecuting a second action that has already been presented in a prior lawsuit. See 
Snyder v. Murray City Corporation, 73 P.3d 325 (Utah 2003). A party seeking a dismissal based 
upon claim preclusion must establish three elements: "First, both cases must involve the same 
parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented 
in the first suit or be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the 
first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits." Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. 
Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000). 
The cross-claim filed by Whatley in this matter involves exactly the same parties 
involved in Whatley v. Chapman-Brvm J. Whatley, Bruce E. Chapman, ana L,en vjiapman. 
Further, this cross-claim involves exactly t^he same subject matter-the c»ffiact/!wliich was signed 
April 5,2001, according to paragraph 26 of Whatley7s amended cross l^affiTiiTthis*matter and 
paragraph 11 of Whatley's Amended Complaint in Whatley v. C/ra>^^RlieCourt^therefore, 
finds that the first two elements of claim preclusion listed above have bo^satisfied. 
The Court next considers the third element-a tmal judgment on the merits, The Court's 
most recent actions in Whatley v. Chapman were its original April 29,2003 order compelling 
arbitration and today's order setting aside the dismissal of the Chapmans from Whatley v. 
5 
Chapman, neither of which is a final judgment.3 Whatley v. Chapman is still open, awaiting the 
arbitration results, as well as the appellate decision sought by Whatley. At the present moment, 
Whatley v. Chapman has not reach a final judgment on the merits. Therefore, claim preclusion is 
not applicable, and dismissal of this action is not appropriate on those grounds. The Court denies 
the Chapmans' Motion to Dismiss Mr. Whatley's Cross Claims Against Bruce and Ceri 
Chapman. 
II. Chapmans' Motion to Compel Arbitration 
The Chapmans also request that the Court order the parties into arbitration on Whatley's 
cross-claim, as it did on Whatley's Amended Complaint in Whatley v. Chapman. The Court has 
carefully examined Whatley's Amended Complaint in Whatley v. Chapman and the cross-claim 
in the present suit and has found the causes of action to be nearly identical. Whatley's amended 
complaint in Whatley v. Chapman was filed months before Whatley's cross-claim in the present 
suit; however, the only changes found in the instant cioss-claim are (1) the deletion of references 
to James Christensen fas per the Court's April 29.2003 order in Whatlev v. Chapman). (2) the 
substitution of "cross-claim defendants" for "defendants," (3) a slight rearrangement in the ordei 
of the counts, and (4) the addition oltwo paragraphs statmg that Whatley seeks indemnity in the 
present suit.4 
3
 Whatley has appealed the Whatley v. Chapman case, even ttiough final judgment had not 
been entered, based upon a statutory provision in the Utah Arbitration Act thai permits appeal 
from orders compelling arbitration, 
4The text of these two paragraphs is as; follows. 
In paragraph 34 of count I : "To the extent that Whatley has any liability on plaintiffs 
6 
Even though the doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply, this Court finds that (1) 
Whatley's cross-claim presents issues identical to the issues in his amended complaint in Whatley 
v. Chapman and that (2) the same contractual provision requiring arbitration in Whatley v. 
Chapman applies in this matter. For the same reasons relied upon in its April 29,2003 ruling in 
Whatley v. Chapman, the Court will compel the parties to arbitrate the causes of action found in 
the cross-claim in this matter. The Court refers to, incorporates, and attaches its ruling in 
Whatley v. Chapman and the new ruling issued today in that matter to this Ruling on Defendant 
Chapman's Motion to Dismiss Cross-Claim and Motion to Compel Arbitration.5 The Court 
grants the Chapmans5 Motion to Compel Arbitration.6 
claims, that liability is exclusively the result of the bad actions of Chapmans as outlined in all but 
the last two counts below and as alleged in plaintiffs complaint, to the extent such allegations 
are true as to World-Wide Photo, which is and has been under the exclusive control of cross-
claim defendants here since the end of April 2002." 
In paragraph 1 of the relief demanded: "A judgment for monetary damages in the amount 
of all liability against Whatley as a result of the plaintiffs action here." 
Neither of these paragraphs alleges new complaints or causes of action, nor do they 
substantially differentiate the cross-claim from the complaint. 
?This does not mean that the parties must submit to a second arbitration tfn the contract, if 
cuui nat ion has already occurred pursuant to* the order in Whatley v. Given the 
identical causes of action in the two cases, one arbitratiotfproceaure snouiasurnce. 
6This ruling does not affect plaintiff MM Property Management's claims against World-
Wide Photo and Whatley. The Court notes that on August 11, ZUUJ plaintiff filed its response to 
Chapmans' motions, which was entitled Plaintiff, MM Property's Answering Memorandum to 
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration (sic), in which it stated the following: "At this 
juncture Plaintiff is content to hold its causes of action in abeyance pending the conclusion of the 
arbitration set for September 9th through the 12th, 2003 on virtual identical issues raised in 
Defendant Whatley's Cross Claim and therefore does not oppose Defendants Motion to Compel 
Arbitration." (sic) 
7 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Chapmans' Motion to Dismiss Whatley's Cross-Claim Against Bruce and Ceri 
Chapman is denied, and their Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted. 
Counsel for defendant Chapmans is to write an order consistent with this ruling, pursuant 
to Rule 4-505 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
DATED this 10th day of November, 2003. 
Case No. 030400447 
^s&jijreil''* 
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